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Abstract 
Theory attributes finance with the ability to both promote growth and reduce output volatility. 
But evidence is mixed in both regards, partly due to endogeneity effects. For example, financial 
institutions themselves might be a source of volatility, as the events of 2008 suggest. We 
address this endogeneity issue by using oil price volatility as a source of exogenous volatility, 
to study the effect of finance. To do this, we use two empirical methodologies. First, we 
develop a quasi-natural experiment by studying the dramatic decline of oil prices in 2014 and 
beyond, using a synthetic control methodology. Our hypothesis is that the ability of oil-rich 
countries to mitigate the effects of this decline rested on the quality of their financial 
institutions. We focus on 11 oil-rich countries between 1980 and 2014 that had “poor” 
measures of financial development (treatment group) out of 20 such countries and 
synthetically create counterfactuals from the remaining (control) group with “superior” 
financial development. We subject both to the oil price shock of 2014. We find evidence that 
better financial institutions do indeed reduce output volatility and mitigate its negative effect 
on growth in the year that showed a sustained decline of the oil price. To address any 
remaining potential endogeneity between oil prices and finance, we further examine our 
findings by using a Panel CS-ARDL approach with 30 oil producing countries in our sample (and 
data over the period 1980-2016), illustrating that the effect of oil price volatility on growth is 
mitigated with better financial institutions. Our results make a strong case for the support of 
the positive role of financial development in growth and development.  
 
JEL Classifications: C23, G20, F43, O13, O40, Q32. 
Keywords: Oil price volatility, financial institutions, economic growth and development, and 
the resource curse. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION  
 
Theoretically, institutions of finance are supposed to promote economic growth via better capital 
allocation, the monitoring and influencing of firms’ governance, the pooling of savings, and the promotion 
of specialization (Levine 1997, 2004). Theoretical considerations also extend to the contribution of finance 
to volatility reduction via its ability to allow agents to diversify risk. For example, Acemoglu and Zilibotti 
(1997) argue that better diversification enables a gradual allocation of funds to their most productive use, 
with more productive specialization reducing the variability of growth.  
But the evidence on whether finance is growth promoting or volatility reducing are mixed.  For 
example, while Levine (1997, 2004) shows that finance is growth promoting, Cecchetti and Kharroubi 
(2012) illustrate the advantages of finance in promoting growth exist only up to a certain point beyond 
which, they become a drag. Evidence on volatility reducing aspects of finance are equally mixed.  For 
example, Braun and Larrain (2005) and Raddatz (2006) find that financial development reduces output 
volatility, while Easterly et al. (2000) find a U-shaped relationship between volatility and financial sector 
depth. Denizer et al. (2002) generally supports a negative correlation between financial depth and growth, 
consumption, and investment volatility, but Acemoglu, et al. (2003) and Beck et al. (2006) find that such 
a relation is not robust.  A more recent paper by Dabla-Norris and Srivisal (2013) finds results regarding 
the volatility effects of finance that echo those found by Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012) on the growth 
effects of finance: i.e., financial depth plays a significant role in dampening the volatility of output, 
consumption, and investment growth, but only up to a certain point. At very high levels, such as those 
observed in many advanced economies, financial depth amplifies consumption and investment volatility. 
Most of the studies above are subject to some endogeneity issues that make establishing causality 
difficult. Consider the financial collapse of 2008 as an example. It is suggested that finance was actually 
the source of the crises and its associated volatility. However, if finance also helped to ameliorate further 
subsequent volatility effects that might have occurred, for example by allowing for greater risk 
diversification, then causal relation will not be easy to establish.  But if we can find an exogenous source 
of volatility that is independent of finance, then we can examine causality.  We find a nearly exogenous 
source of volatility in oil prices as they heavily impacted oil producing countries.1  We then ask what the 
                                                          
1 Note that the exogeneity assumption might not hold in practice where production decisions by some of the major 
oil producers, in particular Saudi Arabia, might have a significant contemporaneous impact on international oil 
prices. Mohaddes and Pesaran (2016), using a compact quarterly model of the global economy, formally test 
whether oil prices can be treated as weakly exogenous in the country-specific oil supply equations, and find that 
they cannot reject this hypothesis for all of the major oil producers, including Saudi Arabia and the United States.   
As for the potential impact of oil on finance, Zhang (2017) use a VAR approach and find that there may possibly be 
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effect of oil price volatility was on both the growth and the volatility of output among oil producers and 
whether financial institutions moderated the nature of the impact. The focus on oil producing countries 
rather than oil importing countries is because oil revenues often constitute a much larger source of 
revenues in oil producing countries than they constitute a component of expenditures in the oil importing 
countries. Moreover, the oil price collapse that occurred starting from the third quarter of 2014 and that 
plays a key role in the first part of our paper, is a “negative” volatility whose impact could not have been 
beneficial to oil producers.2     
Because we use oil prices as our exogenous source of variation and study their effect on oil 
producing economies, our paper is also related to the oil curse literature, or more broadly, to the natural 
resource curse literature. Thus, we briefly review the relevant aspects of this literature. First, we note that 
the prevailing view of the natural resource curse, i.e., the alleged adverse effect of natural resource wealth 
on income or growth, has been challenged by those that show such an effect depends on the quality of 
the underlying institutions (Lane and Tornell, 1996; Mehlum et al., 2006; Robinson et al., 2006; Boschini 
et al., 2007) as well as those who shed doubt on the existence of the curse itself (Alexeev and Conrad, 
2009; Azerki et al., 2017; Cavalcanti et al. 2011; Esfahani et al. (2014); Smith, 2015).3   
Second, we note that in light of these challenges, a new strand of research has emerged that 
focuses on the volatility of resource wealth, instead. For example, Leong and Mohaddes (2011) and El-
Anshasy et al. (2015) have shown that resource rent volatility negatively affects economic growth.4 But 
here again, the intermediating role of institutions arises. Using the Fraser chain-linked index of 
institutional quality, Leong and Mohaddes (2011) find that the negative effect of resource volatility on 
growth is moderated with higher quality institutions.  By virtue of its focus on financial institutions, this 
paper is therefore also related to this last group of studies and is a further refinement of such studies. But 
                                                          
“some causality” from Brent prices to stock market (about a 23%). This would render our index of finance 
endogenous. For this reason, we further augment our SCM approach by using the panel CS-ARDL methodology in 
Section 3 to address any endogeneity issues; and show that our results are robust. 
2 See, for instance, Mohaddes and Raissi (2018) who make this point clear for macro aggregates (such as equity 
prices, GDP, and inflation) and not only for oil producing, but also of countries with high dependence on major oil 
producers (such as non-oil producing Middle East and North Africa countries). 
3 For example, Alexeev and Conrad (2009) show that natural resources appear (falsely) to reduce growth rates 
because they boost base incomes and thus controlling for this effect, uncovers an underlying positive role of natural 
resources in economic growth.  Azerki et al. (2017) use a highly exogenous instrument from the giant oil field 
discoveries dataset, to show that in the long-run oil boosts income. Similar conclusions are reached by Smith (2015). 
Cavalcanti et al. (2011), using the real value of oil production, rent or reserves as a proxy for resource endowment, 
illustrate that oil abundance has a positive effect on both income levels and economic growth. While they accept 
that oil rich countries could benefit more from their natural wealth by adopting growth and welfare enhancing 
policies and institutions, they challenge the common view that oil abundance affects economic growth negatively. 
4 See also Mohaddes and Pesaran (2014). 
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because finance plays a particularly direct role in relation to volatility related issues, our focus on financial 
institutions is a more natural extension of the above studies.   
We carry out our analysis in two ways depending on what we mean by oil price volatility. In the 
first approach, we view volatility as the dramatic drop that oil prices experienced starting from the third 
quarter of 2014. This allows us to consider this particular event as a quazi-natural experiment. Dividing oil 
producing countries into those with good financial institutions (control) and those with poor financial 
institutions (treatment) we study the effect of differences in financial depth across oil rich countries on 
their ability to deal with this dramatic oil price decline by synthetically constructing our counterfactuals 
for each treated country using the synthetic control technique originally pioneered by Abadie and 
Gardeazabal (2003). The advantage of this approach over the prevailing difference-in-difference 
methodology or its propensity score matching refinement is that the synthetic control approach 
overcomes the challenge of the selection of an appropriate control group. Such a group may or may not 
exist even in the absence of sampling errors, due to inherent uncertainties in the choice of a suitable 
control country (Abadie et al., 2010). The synthetic control method constructs a counterfactual that better 
aligns with the treated country along a variety of factors, reducing the pretreatment differences between 
the control and treated country. 
In the second approach, our measure of oil price volatility is not event-based, but rather, based 
on the annual standard deviation of monthly oil prices over the period 1980 to 2016. For this we rely on 
data for 30 major oil producers and a regression approach using the cross-sectionally augmented 
autoregressive distributive lag (CS-ARDL) methodology (Cavalcanti et al., 2015, Chudik and Pesaran, 2015, 
and Chudik et al. 2016), which is estimated using the pooled mean group (PMG) estimation process 
(Pesaran et. al., 1999). 
In what follows, Section 2 presents the methodology, estimation procedure, data, and results for 
the counterfactual synthetic control methodology, Section 3 does the same for the CS-ARDL methodology, 
and Section 4 provides concluding remarks and policy implications.  
 
2. THE SYNTHETIC CONTROL METHOD 
The synthetic control method is a counterfactual approach pioneered by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) 
hence forth known as AG. This is a variation of the difference-in-difference approach, but instead of a 
control group, determined by pre-intervention propensity matching, a synthetic control is constructed 
using a weighted average of potential controls to obtain the “best fit” that would closely match the treated 
unit’s pretreatment variables. AG use this methodology to study how terrorist activities in the Basque 
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region of Spain post 1960, reduced GDP per capita as compared to a synthetic control composed of other 
similar regions that were unaffected by the terrorism. An important modification of this methodology is 
a paper by Singhal and Nilakantan (2016) who study the effect, on economic performance, of 
counterinsurgency policies in India by comparing the performance of one specific region, Andhra Pradesh, 
which developed a specialty task force to combat the Naxalite insurgency, with a synthetic control of other 
similar states which did not have such a specialty task force. In Singhal and Nilakantan (2016), all states in 
India were impacted by the Naxalite insurgency but only Andhra Pradesh developed the task force. This 
is in contrast to the approach by AG in which treatment (terrorism) affected one region but not all.  
Our method is more in line with Singhal and Nilakantan (2016) in that fluctuations in the world oil 
price affect all oil producing countries (analogous to terrorism in India), but the differences in the resulting 
volatility and growth across countries arises due to their differing level of financial development. To 
estimate possible mitigating impact of financial depth in this framework, the treated (control) countries 
are oil producers with “low” (“high”) levels of financial development.5 From this we construct a synthetic 
counterfactual (or control) for each treated country, where both the treated country and its 
counterfactual are similar in relevant aspects and especially in their dependence on oil (measured by oil 
to GDP ratios) but differ in their financial depth. A comparison of the predicted “outcome” in the synthetic 
control with the observed outcome in the treated country will tell us whether or not financial depth 
mitigates the effects of oil price volatility. The primary outcome variables are chosen to be output and 
growth as well as output and growth volatility, as these are the traditional performance metrics, and are 
the variables also involved in testing the natural resource curse hypothesis. We expect output and growth 
volatility to be lower and growth and output to be higher in the synthetic controls when compared to 
their treated counterparts. To test this econometrically, the differences in these measures are regressed 
on a dummy variable that represents pre- and post-oil decline with significant results of its coefficients 
telling a more encompassing story that helps us generalize findings across all treated countries.6 
2.1 Methodology: Constructing the Synthetic Control Country 
Consider a given set of control and treatment groups. Let 𝑾 = (𝑤1, 𝑤2, … , 𝑤𝑗) be a (𝐽 × 1 ) vector of 
non-negative weights, where 𝑤𝑗 is the weight applied to control country j in the resulting synthetic control 
corresponding to a given treatment country (if 𝑤𝑗 = 0, there is no influence of country j on the synthetic 
                                                          
5 The split between “low” and “high” financial development is described in Section 2.2. 
6 See later for expectations and implications of the signs and significance of these coefficients 
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control). Naturally, different vectors of W will generate different synthetic controls. The optimal W is 
obtained by minimizing the expression, 
(𝑿𝟏 − 𝑿𝟎𝑾)′𝑽(𝑿𝟏 − 𝑿𝟎𝑾) 
subject to 𝑤𝑗 ≥ 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑗 and 𝑤1 + 𝑤2 + ⋯ + 𝑤𝑗 = 1 , where 𝑿𝟏 is a (𝐾 × 1 ) vector of pretreatment 
GDP predictors for the treated country; 𝑿𝟎 is a (𝐾 × 𝐽 ) matrix of the same K pretreatment GDP 
predictors for the J possible control countries, V is a diagonal matrix of non-negative components 
reflecting the importance of different GDP predictors. AG suggests that the optimal choice of V is one 
where the resulting synthetic control best matches the pretreatment GDP level of the treated country.7  
The optimal weight vector W* is applied to the GDP of the control countries to obtain the resulting 
synthetic control. i.e. if we define 𝒀𝟏 as a (𝑇 × 1 ) vector of output levels for the treated country and 
𝒀𝟎 as a (𝑇 × 𝐽 ) matrix of output levels for the control countries, the synthetic control for the treated 
country will be the (𝑇 × 1) vector Y1*, such that 
𝒀𝟏
∗ = 𝒀𝟎𝑾
∗. 
Given that the weights are derived from the pretreatment period, the differences between the 
treated country 𝒀𝟏, and its synthetic control 𝒀𝟏
∗ , should be most prominent in the post treatment period 
as a result of change in the nature of the relationship between output and its predictors due to the 
treatment (i.e. if the treatment proves relevant).  Thus, the difference between Y1 and Y*1 are attributed 
to the treatment. The degree of fit of the pretreatment variable of interest (in our case GDP) is what AG 
refers to as the root mean square prediction error (RMSPE). This is simply the sum of squares of the 
difference between the resulting synthetic control measures of GDP and the treated country’s GDP in the 
pretreatment period. The output predictors used include the oil-to-GDP ratio, population, capital stock, 
initial level of output, imports, exports, trade-to-GDP ratios, capital restrictions (measured by the Chinn-
Ito, 2006 index) and sovereign wealth funds, specifically, the value of the sovereign wealth fund each 
country possessed at the beginning of the oil price decline.8  
  
                                                          
7 To find the optimal vector W*, V is initially assumed to be an identity matrix and an initial W’ is calculated. This W’ 
yields the best match to the treated country’s GDP measure without taking into account the degree of importance 
of each of the predictors. Using this initial W’, the optimal V matrix is then calculated identifying the degree of 
importance placed on each predictor. Finally, V is used to calculate the final optimal weight W*. W* takes the 
importance of the GDP predictors into account and provides a good fit to the treated country’s pre-treatment GDP.  
8 The ability of countries to draw on their sovereign wealth funds in order to dampen the negative effects of 
commodity price volatility is well documented in Mohaddes and Raissi (2017). 
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2.2 Estimation Procedure  
As a step towards the goal of this paper we exploit the recent decline in oil prices in the third quarter of 
2014 as a source of exogenous variation. As can be seen from Figure 1, the 2014 decline in the last nine 
years is second only to the fallout from the 2008 financial crisis (and not by much). Unlike the 2008 decline 
in which finance was the trigger for the crisis and subsequent reaction of the financial institutions that led 
to the mitigation of the crisis (Jarrett and Mohtadi, 2017), the 2014 decline has been attributed to a 
technology shock (shale oil extraction in the United States) and in this case, plausibly exogenous to 
financial depth in this regard.9 The technological advancements over the last decade have not only 
reduced the costs associated with the production of unconventional oil, but also made extraction of tight 
oil resemble a manufacturing process in which one can adjust production in response to price changes 
with relative ease. Therefore, one of the implications of the shale oil revolution is that U.S. production can 
play a significant role in balancing global demand and supply, and this in turn implies that the current low 
oil price environment could be persistent (see Mohaddes and Raissi, 2018). Moreover, a recent study has 
also found that output elasticity of unconventional new wells to price changes is 3-4 times conventional 
wells. This combination produces a floor for the oil prices that may be hard to escape (see, for instance, 
Bjørnland et al., 2016 and Mohaddes and Pesaran, 2017).  
 
Figure 1: Monthly Oil Prices 
 
                                                          
9 A clear example of this reaction by the financial institutions during the great recession is the increase in bank 
reserves as well as the reduction in lending activities. No such reaction was observed during the 2014 decline in oil 
prices making it exogenous to financial depth. 
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To determine the potential mitigating effect of financial depth on countries that suffer a 
significant deterioration of performance due to the drop in the price of oil, two factors need to be 
considered: first, to pay particular attention to oil rich/dependent countries as this would be the group 
most impacted by the shock; and the second, to sort the oil rich group into ones with “superior” financial 
depth and ones without. To accomplish these two goals, we first select countries in the 80th percentile in 
annual oil value to GDP ratio.10 Both the control and treatment group are then selected from this pool. 
Next, we choose a performance variable. Since all countries are equally exposed to the variations in the 
oil price, we must find a variable that transmits oil price volatility into country level effects to capture 
cross-country variations while also reflecting oil price volatility. The most commonly impacted variable is 
naturally the output level, making GDP an appropriate performance variable to use. Finally, we divide the 
selected countries into two groups; those above-median levels of financial development (Group A), and 
those below-median (Group B).11 This cutoff was chosen with the number of countries in mind. If the cut-
off is too high or too low, we would either no longer have enough countries in the control group with 
which to form appropriate synthetic controls or enough of the treated countries with which to make more 
general statements. Group A countries constitute the potential set for constructing the synthetic controls 
for each country in group B (the treated group).12 
With these considerations, we have 26 countries with average oil to GDP ratio from 8.9% to 59%, 
and financial measure split between 16 treated countries in group B and 10 potential control countries in 
group A. From the selection of treated countries, we drop Egypt, Yemen and Venezuela because their 
political and social instability in post-treatment period, would certainly generate higher levels of output 
volatility that cannot be disentangled from volatility from oil price and as such, inclusion of these countries 
                                                          
10 Oil to GDP ratio is from Oil and Gas data (Ross, 2013), available at http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/mlross 
11 The median used for this separation is the median of the average of all financial subset measures in the Fraser 
chain linked index that measures institutional quality, see section 2.3. The list of countries in each group is provided 
in the Appendix. 
12 To further emphasize the effect of financial depth, different cutoffs of financial depth were employed. Countries 
were split into two groups; one group above the 70th percentile level of financial development (Group A), and the 
second, having below the 40th percentile level of financial development (Group B) resulting in a sample of 15 
countries with 9 treated countries in group B and 6 potential control countries in group A. There was some evidence 
in support of financial depth alleviating the negative effects of oil price volatility, but the results were mixed. The 
issue with this approach is the limitation in the number of potential control countries such that adequate synthetic 
controls may not be possible to construct. This limitation is also the reason why the fits obtained in the main analysis 
are not as accurate as some others in the literature, where what they study allows them to have more countries in 
their control “bucket”. The results for this analysis are not reported in this version of the paper but are available 
from the authors upon request.  
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will contaminate our results if left in our sample. We also drop Saudi Arabia given its singular ability to 
adjust extraction policies to influence changes in oil price which would potentially introduce treatment 
bias (see footnote 1).  
  In order to highlight the effect of financial depth, measures of financial depth themselves must 
be omitted from the set of output predictor variables that are used in the synthetic control construction 
since by design synthetic controls have higher levels of financial development than the treated country.   
It is important to note that apart from our proposed indirect effect of financial depth on output 
through oil price volatility mitigation, there is also the well documented direct effect of financial 
development on output (see, for instance, Levine, 1997). This implies that we do not expect the 
pretreatment output levels to be a close match and should differ with varying degrees, depending on how 
much dispersion there is between financial development measures of the synthetic control and the 
treated country.  Rather, than an obstacle to our analysis, we take advantage of this unique property by 
developing placebo tests in the following way: we make the erroneous assumption that countries in the 
control group with high financial development measures (Group A) have poor finances. We then create 
synthetic controls for each country in group A (one at a time) using the remaining control countries. First, 
we expect the output levels of both the synthetic control and the “treated” country in the placebo tests 
to better align due to resulting similar financial measures, i.e. we expect the synthetic controls of our 
placebo tests to have lower average RMSPE when compared with the average RMSPE of the treated 
countries. This will add an extra layer to our analysis and to the literature on the finance-growth nexus by 
showing the degree of importance of financial depth in determining levels of output when these placebo 
tests are carried out. Secondly, we would expect to see similar fluctuations in output in the pre and post 
treatment period for both the synthetic control and “treated” country in the placebo tests again as a result 
of similar financial depth measures. This will serve as verification that results picked up by the main test 
are valid.  
We also rule out Chad from the main analysis due to a comparable lack of pretreatment fit of its 
synthetic control. While we allow some leeway for the pretreatment fit due to the absence of the financial 
depth measure in creating the synthetic control, the RMSPE for Chad is 3.5 standard deviations away from 
the mean of all countries in the treated group which average a RMSPE of 0.29. AG suggests that countries 
for whom adequate synthetic controls cannot be obtained (very high RMSPE) are outside the convex hull 
of the potential control countries. To intuit, this would otherwise amount to creating a synthetic control 
for the United States from countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. We therefore have 12 countries left in the 
treatment group. From this group, Nigeria is removed from the initial analysis as the country rebased its 
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GDP in 2013 just prior the treatment period under study, thus altering its measure of dependence on oil 
in the pre and post treatment periods. However, we draw on this particular example to make a separate 
point in Section 2.6 that ties well with our results while simultaneously providing valuable information 
about the natural resource curse literature. 
2.3 Data 
We use quarterly data (between 2006Q1 and 2016Q4), as this allows for more observations especially 
needed for the post-2014 period given that we only have three annual observations post 2014. Quarterly 
data is also very useful as it allows us to calculate annual volatility. For a majority of the countries with 
poor financial measures, quarterly observations on key variables are not reported and as a result, these 
variables need to be estimated. For the period chosen, quarterly data on imports and exports are the only 
data points available for the countries in our analysis. We therefore use these variables to generate 
quarterly output levels. To do so, we first obtain annual measures of import to GDP ratio, and then use 
the quarterly imports data to generate quarterly output measures for each country.  Our assumption is 
that quarterly ratios remain roughly constant over the quarters within that year. We use this as our 
primary estimate of quarterly GDP given the relationship between imports and GDP and the well-
established literature on marginal propensity to import resulting from changes in GDP (see, for instance, 
Chang, 1946, Shinohara, 1957 and Golub, 1983).  
To further validate this as a viable measure, we obtain actual seasonally adjusted quarterly GDP 
data from 44 countries as well as their corresponding measures of quarterly imports and annual import 
to GDP ratios. We calculate GDP estimates based on the proposed system above and compare the 
estimates to the actual quarterly GDP measures. There is an overall correlation coefficient of 0.92, 
suggesting a significant relationship between the actual and our estimated output data. We also faced 
similar data restrictions with respect to the predictor variables. To overcome these limitations, we made 
similar assumptions that the variables remained constant across all quarters for each year, which is not 
unreasonable as we do not expect significant changes in capital stock and capital restrictions between 
each quarter of a particular year. 
 As a measure of financial depth, we turn to the financial components of the Fraser chain linked 
index of cross-country institutional quality. As a result, our measure of domestic financial depth is the 
average of the following sub-components of the Fraser chain index defined as follows:   
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i. ownership of banks (oob) which measures the percentage of bank deposits held in privately 
owned banks where countries with a higher percentage of these deposits receive a higher “oob” 
rating;  
ii. private sector credit (psc) which measures government borrowing relative to private borrowing 
with higher government borrowing ratios receiving a lower rating. The assumption here is that 
greater government borrowing implies more central planning; and  
iii. interest rate controls (irc) uses data on credit market controls.  Countries where interest rates are 
determined by the markets, countries with stable monetary policy and reasonable real deposit 
and lending rate spreads receive higher ratings (Gwartney et. al. 2015).  
 In general, these measures capture the degree of private financial freedom, assigning higher 
ratings to countries with greater financial freedom (giving them the ability to facilitate growth in their 
financial infrastructure) and lower ratings to countries with greater government or central control which 
financial market participants and researchers alike have suggested hampers financial growth. This 
measure differs from the more traditional indices of financial depth that measure observable outcomes 
(e.g, actual measures of private sector deposits and private sector lending) but instead capture a measure 
of the structural framework of the financial sector; its behavior and practices that tend to be stable over 
time. Therefore, we can make the claim that these countries do not necessarily become decentralized due 
to oil discoveries keeping our financial measures relatively stable in the pre and post treatment period. 
This implies that these measures are not subject to the potential reverse causality as a result of the 
findings of Beck and Poelhekke (2017) that suggest that oil price shocks can in turn influence the financial 
depth level. Since these financial indices are not affected, no such reverse causality exists.  
2.4 Results and Interpretation 
Table 1 shows the optimal weights assigned to each potential control country. To highlight the 
effectiveness of the matching process (with the preference slanted towards matching output levels), Table 
2 shows the averages of the predictor variables for all treated countries and their corresponding 
counterfactual synthetic controls. The differences between the synthetic control and the treated group 
appear small, suggesting that the counterfactual and the treated countries are indeed similar at least with 
respect to these specific measures.13 However, given that oil volatility is an ongoing phenomenon, the oil 
                                                          
13 Since we place less emphasis on the fit of the level of the synthetic control and more on the volatility and growth 
differential, the corresponding graphs for the synthetic and treated countries are not as informative and as such are 
not reported here but are available upon request from the authors.  
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price decline of post-2014 period is not unique but one in the history of oil price volatility in the post-
World War two period. As such, our approach does not contain a classic pre-treatment period in which 
control and treatment countries exhibit identical behavior. Rather, our control and treatment group differ 
by their financial depth and as such, the analysis we undertake below highlights the consequence of this 
difference for output by examining the relationship between the treated and control before and after the 
significant drop in oil prices.  
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 here] 
 
To provide a clearer picture and a conclusion that compares the performance of countries with 
high financial depth to those with low financial depth, the following regressions are run 
 
𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜_𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀1𝑖,𝑡                                            (1) 
𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼2 + 𝛽2𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀2𝑖,𝑡                                           (2) 
                                                          𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓_𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼3 + 𝛽3𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀3𝑖,𝑡                                               (3) 
𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼4 + 𝛽4𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀4𝑖,𝑡                                              (4) 
 
Where ratio_output (ratio_growth) is the ratio of annual output (growth) volatility (treated 
volatility/control volatility) calculated from the resulting quarterly observations, diff_output (diff_growth) 
is the difference in annualized output (growth) between treated and control countries.14 The dummy 
variable is zero before 2014 and 1 after 2014. We expect 𝛽1and 𝛽2 to be positive suggesting that the 
treated countries showed significantly more volatility than the control post 2014 with respect to output 
and growth. We also expect 𝛽3 and 𝛽4 to be negative suggesting that the treated countries had 
significantly lower output and growth post 2014 than their synthetic control.15  
Table 3 captures the results from equations (1) to (4) above. Columns 1 to 4 show positive and 
significant coefficients as expected suggesting that the synthetic controls had less volatility due to their 
financial depth compared to their treated counterparts and this manifested as higher volatility in both 
growth and output post 2014. When we exclude the two countries (Cameroon and Indonesia) with oil-to-
                                                          
14 The annual output (growth) volatility data is generated by computing the standard deviation of quarterly output 
(growth) in a given year. The growth rate of GDP is calculated as the first difference of natural logs of output. Note 
that the difference measure discussed here is always treated observations – synthetic control observations. 
15 The smaller the difference in output or growth (less positive or more negative), the worse off the treated country 
is compared to the synthetic control 
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GDP ratios less than 10%, we observe that the coefficients are larger, giving credence to the idea that the 
ability of the financial sector to mitigate the negative effects depends on the degree of dependence.16  
While a majority of the differences in output and growth are negative as was expected, none of 
them are significant. A possible explanation is that by 2016, the uptick in oil prices may have offset some 
of the negative effects observed in the 2014/2015 period. This effect should be especially pronounced 
with respect to the growth rate measures since a lower base value of GDP would exaggerate any increase 
in subsequent growth. To address this issue, the same regressions are estimated excluding 2016 and the 
results are summarized in Table 4. Concentrating on 2014 and 2015 only, we see negative and significant 
differences in output and growth in the post treatment period supporting the point above regarding the 
2016 uptick in oil prices. Also, note that the results for growth are even stronger as expected per 
discussion above. 
[Insert Tables 3 and 4 here] 
 
2.5 Placebo Tests 
Following the tradition in counterfactual methodologies, we perform placebo tests as a measure of 
robustness. To do this, we assume that the control countries with superior financial development 
measures actually have subpar financial measures and re-run the same analysis, one control country at a 
time. Each time a control country is being “treated”, it is removed from the control set.17  
As hypothesized, the RMSPE in the placebo test is 0.133, slightly less than half of the RMSPE in 
the treatment group (0.299). This resulting better fit highlights the importance of the contribution of 
financial depth to output. The second and main point of the placebo tests is to determine if the effect 
found in the treated tests still persists when treated and synthetic controls have similar financial depth 
measures. According to our hypothesis, we expect that there should be no discernable difference in any 
of our variables before and after the reduction in oil price. In terms of our model, we expect much smaller 
and potentially insignificant coefficients 𝛽1, 𝛽2, 𝛽3 and 𝛽4 when compared to the same estimates in Tables 
3 and 4 above.  
                                                          
16 This point will be formalized with the case study of Nigeria, see section 2.6. 
17 This is in contrast to the methodology suggested by AG. AG uses the idea that if there is no real difference, the 
treated countries should also be introduced in the “bucket” of control countries used in forming synthetic controls 
for the placebo tests. Our approach takes things a step further and tries to show that this need not be done to show 
that the effect among financially deep countries is negligible. This suggests an even stronger repudiation of 
arguments against our findings compared to the standard approach by AG. 
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[Insert Tables 5 and 6 here] 
 
To this end Table 5 replicates Table 3, from which we can see that the coefficients are far smaller 
and less significant than in Table 3, supporting the case for our main hypothesis that it is indeed the 
differences in financial depth that account for the differences in Table 3 between the pre and post 2014 
periods. Columns 5 to 8 in Table 5 report the results for those countries that have much better fits18, being 
in line with the results from columns 1 to 4. To replicate the effect of differences in output and growth 
that take the uptick in oil price in 2016, Table 6 replicates the findings in Table 4 for the placebo tests as 
well. We see that one again, unlike Table 4, all coefficients are far smaller and statistically insignificant, 
suggesting that the effect of better financial depth is what is driving the results.  
 
2.6     Nigeria the Oddity: Dependence Matters 
In this section, which speaks more to the natural resource curse literature, we use the unique 
circumstances surrounding Nigeria’s GDP as an experiment within an experiment to investigate the impact 
of oil dependence on the ability of the financial sector to mitigate the negative effects of oil price volatility. 
The premise is simple, Nigeria re-based its GDP measure in 2013 which saw its output grow by about 89% 
in one year. This revision took the non-oil sectors (mainly telecoms, manufacturing and the prolific 
entertainment industries) more prominently into account implying a lower dependence on oil in the post-
2014 period compared to its pre-treatment period.19 We stipulate that, if the degree of dependence does 
not matter, we would expect to see similar results in Nigeria as we have encountered in the treated 
countries above, where post-2014 trend indicated higher comparative volatility (i.e. compared to their 
corresponding synthetic control). However, if dependence matters, we would see that Nigeria (the 
treatment country) is more volatile in the pre-2014 period than its financially advanced counterfactual 
and is less so when the degree of dependence on oil is reduced post 2014 after it’s GDP has been rebased 
(despite the negative price shock and the synthetic control having greater financial depth, both of which 
should have implied even higher volatility for Nigeria post 2014).  
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
                                                          
18 These regressions exclude countries for which the nested option on Stata for synth estimation could not be used, 
resulting in much less precise fits. 
19 See Nigeria’s GDP Step Change in The Economist (April 12, 2014). https://www.economist.com/news/finance-
and-economics/21600734-revised-figures-show-nigeria-africas-largest-economy-step-change 
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Table 7 highlights pre and post-2014 volatility measures as well as output and growth levels for 
Nigeria. From Table 7, we see that both output and growth volatility for Nigeria in the pre-2014 period 
was much higher when oil revenues made up a higher percentage of their GDP. In the post 2014 era 
however, we see that there is no difference in output volatility and an even smaller growth volatility when 
compared to its synthetic counterfactual. We find no discernable difference in average growth rates as all 
differences are insignificant but with respect to output, we see no difference in average output in the pre-
2014 period20, while the post 2014 period shows that Nigeria had higher average output levels when 
compared with the synthetic control, reflecting the reduced role of oil revenues in GDP. This strongly 
suggests that the ability of a country’s financial sector to mitigate the negative effects of oil price volatility 
is positively correlated with the degree of dependence on oil, and as such, higher degrees of dependence 
on oil should be accompanied by higher financial depth. 
 
3. The PANEL CS-ARDL MODEL  
The results in Section 2 point to a significant effect of financial depth in mitigating oil price volatility, 
ultimately leading to higher levels of output and growth. To address concerns about the endogeneity 
between oil prices and finance (e.g. Zhang, 2017), we re-examine our earlier findings by extending the 
scope of our analysis to include more countries over a longer period of time as well as employing a 
different methodology – the cross-sectionally augmented autoregressive distributed lag (CS-ARDL) 
model.21 We are thus able to focus on four significant drops in oil prices between 1980 and 2016, namely 
1986, 1998, 2009 and 2015.  These four years indicate an unusually large drop in oil prices as will be 
explained shortly.  
 
3.1 Methodology and Estimation Procedure  
In an analysis such as this where institutional variables are involved, a high degree of persistence in the 
level of these measures is to be expected, rendering analyses that depend on taking a first difference or 
demeaning less than appropriate. An alternative would be to take five-year averages as is commonly done, 
but doing so eliminates some variation in other variables of interest such as the growth rate of oil prices 
                                                          
20 This is to be expected given the way in which the counterfactual was created. 
21 While this method is capable of addressing potential endogeneity issues, the drawback of this approach is the loss 
of sub annual data points for which to calculate annual output and growth volatility. As a result, this approach 
focuses on the eventual effects of financial mitigation on growth, given historic oil price volatility.  
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and its volatility. The CS-ARDL approach allows us to study the long-run effects of these persistent 
institutional variables in conjunction with the evolution of the more erratic behavior of oil prices using 
annual data. Moreover, in a series of papers, Pesaran and Smith (1995), Pesaran (1997), and Pesaran and 
Shin (1999) show that the traditional ARDL approach can not only be used for long-run analysis, but that 
it is also valid regardless of whether the regressors are exogenous or endogenous, and whether the 
underlying variables are I(0) or I(1).  These features of the panel ARDL approach are appealing as reverse 
causality could be important in our empirical application. Furthermore, by employing a panel CS-ARDL 
model, we take into account cross-sectional dependencies in errors due to possible global factors 
(including the stance of global financial cycle) and/or spillover effects from one country to another which 
tend to magnify at times of financial crises.22 We therefore estimate the following equation:  
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑙∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑙
𝑝
𝑙=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑙
𝑝
𝑙=0 𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜑𝑖𝑙
𝑝
𝑙=0 𝑤𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛿𝑙
𝑝
𝑙=0 𝑦𝑡−𝑙̅̅ ̅̅ ̅   + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑙
𝑝
𝑙=0 𝑧𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,      (5) 
 
where, 𝑦𝑖𝑡  is the natural logarithm of real GDP per capita, ∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the growth rate of real GDP per capita, 
and 𝑦?̅?   is the cross-sectional averages of 𝑦𝑖𝑡  at time t, 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is the growth rate of real oil prices (∆𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡), 
and 𝑤𝑖𝑡  represents oil price volatility, driven by large price drops. To create this variable we interact 
realized real oil price growth volatility for year t, 𝜎𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑙,𝑡, constructed as the standard deviation of the year-
on-year growth rates of the natural logarithm of real oil prices, 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑖𝜏 during months τ = 1,…,12 in year t, 
with a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 during years of significant oil price drops and 0 
otherwise. Therefore, in contrast to most studies in the growth literature which employ time-invariant 
measures of volatility, we are able to construct a time-varying measure of oil price volatility. Finally, 𝒛𝑖𝑡 is 
a vector representing the interaction of the above measure (𝑤𝑖𝑡) with the financial variables of interest, 
i.e. the financial components of the Fraser chain linked index of institutional quality explained in detail in 
Section 2.3. A comparison of models, one with estimates of 𝑤𝑖𝑡 but without 𝒛𝑖𝑡 and another with 𝒛𝑖𝑡 but 
without 𝑤𝑖𝑡 should provide evidence of the effect of the financial depth.
23 Comparing the coefficients of 
𝑤𝑖𝑡 and 𝒛𝑖𝑡, 𝑤e expect the coefficients of 𝒛𝑖𝑡 to be smaller so as to illustrate the effect of financial depth 
in mitigating the effects of negative oil price growth volatility 
 
3.2 Data 
We begin with an annual dataset comprised of 194 countries between 1980 and 2016. Note that we 
must allow for enough lags, p, such the residuals of the error-correction model are serially uncorrelated 
                                                          
22 See Chudik and Pesaran (2015) for details on cross-sectional adjustment.  
23 Since the only difference between these two specifications is the introduction of finance in the second interaction 
term 𝒛𝑖𝑡. 
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but not too many lags so that it imposes excessive parameter requirements on the data, i.e. allowing for 
enough degrees of freedom. Mohaddes and Raissi (2017) suggest capping the lags at 3 and this is the 
approach that we take. However, to allow for enough lags, sufficient time series observations for each 
country is needed, we therefore require each country to have at least 25 consecutive observations on 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡 , 𝑤𝑖𝑡   and 𝒛𝑖𝑡.
24  
 Because of missing observations for some of the countries in case of the institutional variables,25 
our sample is reduced to 62 countries. Moreover, since we are interested in countries that produce oil, 
we calculate the average of oil-value-to-GDP ratio for all countries in our dataset over a 30-year period 
and select only countries above the 50th percentile (which is a cutoff that includes countries that have at 
least an oil value to GDP of 0.09%). What remains is a sample of 30 oil producers with T greater than 25. 
Table 15 in the Appendix provides a list of the 30 countries, as well as their average financial measures 
and the ratio of oil value to GDP. 
  
3.3 Results 
Estimating equation (5) we present the long-run estimates of the CS-ARDL regressions in Tables 8-11. 
More specifically in Table 8 we examine the role of the domestic financial institutions as a whole; Table 9 
examines the role of each subcomponent of financial institutions with Table 10 isolating the effect of 
financial institutions from overall institutions in general and finally in Table 11 we examine the 
effectiveness of the financial sector controlling, respectively, for differing degrees of openness. For each 
table, the first three columns are base regressions with which subsequent columns can be compared to 
show the effect of a variable in question.  
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
 In Table 8, the first three columns indicate that GDP growth is impacted positively and significantly 
by oil price growth and negatively and significantly by the oil price growth volatility in all three lag 
specifications. This provides support to that the fact that the oil curse, in the sense of oil abundance, is 
not the source of depressed growth in and of itself but that the volatility of its price is, being in line with 
                                                          
24 Chudik et al. (2017) and Mohaddes and Raissi (2017) suggest the minimum T to be around 25 for each i. 
25 While we have annual data on domestic financial institutions from 2000 onward, the data between 1970 and 2000 
is reported at five year intervals only. However, since institutional variables change only very gradually over time, 
we obtain annual series for these variables from 1970-2014 by linearly interpolating each institutional variable on a 
country-by- country basis. 
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the most recent literature. The question is what is the effect of financial institutions in dampening this 
volatility curse.   
 
3.3.1  The Role of Financial Institutions 
Commodity prices are never entirely predictable and oil prices are no exception. However, moderate price 
fluctuations can be “expected” as the outcome of forecasting models within reasonable confidence bands 
and internalized by agents’ behavior as for example in firms’ and investors’ hedging strategies.  Large 
shocks that deviate greatly from historical means, however, are often unexpected and this is where we 
would expect stronger financial institutions to better mitigate the resulting effects.  The analogy to bank’s 
expected and unexpected loan default rates illustrates this point: expected loan defaults, those within 
certain standard deviation of the mean of the probability distribution of default, are considered 
idiosyncratic risks and allowed for in the loan reserves. However, unexpected defaults, i.e., those 
exceeding a pre-determined standard deviation from the mean, are considered part of systemic risk and 
only addressed by banks’ capital requirements. Under severe downturns as in 2008, banks with low capital 
were unable to survive the massive effect of default.  Now consider Figure 2 below that shows oil price 
growth between 1980 and 2016. If we define unexpected shocks as those “out of the norm” when oil price 
shocks are greater than one standard deviation from the mean, we arrive at the “unexpected oil shocks” 
in 1986, 1998, 2009 and 2015.26 
Figure 2: Oil Price Growth, 1980 – 2016 
 
                                                          
26 There are also periods that show positive oil price shocks, but we will only focus on the negative unexpected 
shocks as this is where we believe mitigation of financial institutions is most evident. 
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The fact that this approach includes the most recent large oil price drop provide us with a 
robustness check on the validity of SCM method which also focused on the same period.  But since we are 
now also able to include other periods of large price drop here, our approach in this section goes beyond 
a robustness check and actually generalizes the hypothesis of the mitigating role of finance to any period 
where such a shock is experienced.  Columns 4 to 9 of table 8 presents the results of this analysis. 
As the first step, columns 4 to 6 introduce the measure of “negative oil shocks” which we have 
denoted as 𝒘𝑖𝑡 in equation (5). This measure is constructed by the interaction of oil price growth volatility 
with a dummy variable which takes the value of 1, when oil price growth is negative beyond one standard 
deviation of the mean, and 0 otherwise, signifying unexpected negative oil price shocks. We see first and 
foremost that the magnitude of the coefficient of negative oil shocks is about two and half times larger 
than that of oil price growth volatility in columns 1 through 3. This suggests that a majority of the negative 
effects of volatility come from these large (and therefore likely unexpected) shocks, and that the “positive 
shocks” may have cushioned the overall effect of volatility, given the smaller coefficients in columns 1 to 
3.  
Our key results are shown in columns 7-9. Here, we examine the mitigating property of financial 
institutions in the face of large drops in oil prices. To do this, we interact the financial institutions index 
with our measure of negative oil shocks. Comparing columns 4-6 to columns 7-9, the strong mitigating 
role of financial depth in cushioning the effect of the negative oil shock is self-evident: the coefficients of 
“Finance” when interacted with “Negative Oil Shocks” in columns 7-9, although still negative, are far less 
than then negative effects of the corresponding coefficients of oil shock but without finance, about one 
tenth of the latter (i.e., -5.009 vs -0.309; -8.625 vs -0.893; -11.04 vs -0.868). This points to the benefits of 
strong financial institutions.  Notice also that in columns 7-9 the coefficient of “Finance” itself is highly 
significant and positive.  This reinforces the fact that the negative coefficient of the interaction term, 
comes entirely from the adverse effect of negative oil shock, not financial institutions. The mitigating 
effect of financial institutions in the presence of unexpected negative shocks echoes our finding of Section 
2, where we used the SCM method. In the end however, finance can only cushion the blow, but not 
reverse it.    
 
3.3.2 Decomposing the Financial Variables  
Of interest is the financial mechanism by which risk is diversified and thus the volatility effect is mitigated. 
All three measures of finance as described in Section 2 are close proxies for the ability of the market to 
reflect risk premium and thus to allocate capital efficiently. With the measure of private sector credit, the 
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larger is the size of private sector credit relative to government borrowing, the less is the chance that 
credit is rationed via non-market and political methods and the greater the ability of the market to reflect 
risk premium. With the ownership of banks measure, less government bank ownership also suggests 
lower chances of credit rationing. The final measure of finance is a direct measure of the degree of interest 
rate control, the presence of which decreases the ability of the market to reflect risk premium eliminating 
the potential for efficient capital allocation. The ability for financial institutions to efficiently allocate 
capital is appealing as it has the potential to improve the productivity of capital and thus the rate of 
growth, describing in a bit more detail the way in which financial institutions can mitigate the effect of oil 
price growth volatility. Table 9 provides the results of each individual variable.  Columns 1-3 provide the 
benchmark regressions. These are just duplicates of columns 4-6 of table 8.  The rest of the columns repeat 
the pattern of columns 7-9 of table 8 in which finance interacted with deep negative oil shocks, repeating 
that pattern three times for each of the three subcomponents of financial depth.    
 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
 
The results in Table 9 indicate that, without exception, all sub-components of finance are capable of 
mitigating the impact of negative oil shocks, echoing the results found in Table 8. The strongest mitigation 
effect (measured by the degree of reduction in the size of the negative coefficient) belongs to the 
ownership of banks measure, followed by the interest rate control and private sector credit.  
 
3.3.3 Openness and the Ability of Financial Institutions to Mitigate Volatility 
As highlighted earlier, Chinn and Ito (2006) point to a connection between financial openness and financial 
institutions. Economic openness is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it promotes growth, via 
specialization, economies of scale made in exports and reverse engineering via imports (see Bayoumi, Coe 
and Helpman, 1999; Datta and Mohtadi, 2006) and on the other, it acts as a pathway through which 
transmission of crises and volatility can spread, of which the former has been shown for the 2008 global 
financial crisis (Jarrett and Mohtadi, 2017). It is this latter effect that is of concern as it influences the 
ability of the financial sector to mitigate volatility by potentially adding extra sources of volatility.  Studies 
of financial openness span the spectrum of outcomes; from those in which financial openness is identified 
as the culprit in the spread of crises (Ozkan and Unsal, 2012) to those that hail financial openness as a 
contributor to growth (Ranciere et. al. 2006; Schmukler, 2004). Studies of trade openness have not been 
exempt from this diversity of findings either, with findings ranging from those in which trade openness 
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reduces the impact of financial crises and contributes positively to growth (Cavallo and Frankel, 2008), to 
those in which it is a detriment, increasing the duration and the severity of crises (Classens et. al. 2010; 
Classens et. al. 2012).  Given the wide-ranging opinions and evidence on the effects of economic openness, 
it is uncertain what role economic openness would play in the ability of financial institutions to mitigate 
the effect of oil price volatility. Furthermore, the volatility smoothing effects of trade, in particular, are 
less clear. An oil producer could potentially adjust its degree of trade openness by adjusting its production 
to export more (or less as the situation demands) in order to maintain a more stable revenue growth in 
the presence of oil price fluctuations (as seen more recently in Saudi Arabia). This raises the possibility 
that changes in the degree of openness is an important factor in identifying the efficacy of the financial 
sector in mitigating oil price volatility. While this issue has been addressed in the synthetic control 
methodology (which includes trade to GDP ratios as well as capital restriction measures), it has not been 
addressed, as yet, in the panel CS-ARDL approach. To properly identify the effects of the financial 
institutions, we introduce the following openness measures one at a time: 
i. Trade openness measure: the standard total exports plus imports as a fraction of GDP 
ii. The de-facto measure of financial openness/integration defined by Lane-Milesi-Ferretti 
(1997) as the sum of assets and liabilities as a fraction of GDP. We calculate these from 
international investment positions data provided by the IMF database from 1980 to 2010.  
iii. The Chin-Ito (2006) de-jure financial openness measure which captures the degree of capital 
restrictions with countries that have more capital restrictions getting a lower score. 
 
Table 10 captures the mitigating effects of financial institutions in the presence of these openness 
controls.  The table repeats the previous benchmark regressions in columns 1-3, followed by interaction 
effects in the presence of different measures of openness as controls. As can be seen, the estimates 
indicate the same dramatic reduction in the size of the oil shock effect when in the presence of strong 
financial institutions, and now also economic openness, pointing to the robustness of the previous 
findings. 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
 
3.3.4. Distinguishing Institutions at large from Financial Institutions  
One counter argument is that countries with better financial institutions are those with better overall 
institutions and it is this latent variable that leads to these findings. In fact, several papers have argued 
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that for financial institutions to thrive, there must be a suitable institutional environment within the 
country. For example, Qian and Strahan (2007) suggest that the differences between institutions 
(especially legal differentials) drive the ownership of banks and terms of loans issued by said banks. The 
same focus on legal differentials is echoed by Chinn and Ito (2006) as they suggest that financial openness 
only leads to equity market development as long as the country has reached a certain level of legal 
development. To separate the effects of financial depth from other institutional measures, we turn again 
to the creation of the Fraser chained link index by Gwartney et al. (2015).  In this index, several aspects of 
institutional quality are aggregated to create an overall measure of institutions. 
We therefore test for the differential dampening effects of financial institutions and overall 
institutions by running the same set of regressions for the overall institutional measure and comparing its 
degree of mitigation to that of finance. Whichever variable shows a greater degree of mitigation when 
compared to our baseline, has the higher mitigating effect in the long run and the degree to which the 
mitigation differs is how much better (or worse) one variable is, when compared to the other.  
[Insert Table 11 here] 
Columns 1 to 3 of Table 11 present our baseline and columns 4 to 6 re-states the effectiveness of 
the financial depth measure. Columns 7 to 9 of Table 11 shows results of regressions run for institutions 
as opposed to financial depth. With the exception of the second lag specification, we see that the financial 
depth measure marginally outperforms the overall institutional measure in its ability to mitigate price 
volatility even though the latter has a stronger direct positive effect on long-run growth. Given the 
compositional nature of the Fraser chain linked index, the question remains, why is the mitigating effect 
of overall institutions less than that of one of its composite measures? To answer this question, we 
examine the correlation between the overall index and some of its components. From Table 12 we see 
that the financial measures have a high degree of correlation with the overall measure, while the non-
financial components exhibit mostly large negative correlation with the overall measure (with only one 
showing a small positive correlation).  All this strongly suggests that it is the dampening effect of finance, 
as opposed to other factors, that drives the mitigation effect of the overall Fraser chains index on oil price 
growth volatility.27 
[Insert Table 12 here] 
                                                          
27 In an earlier version of this paper, we found that countries with high marks for court impartiality are also able to 
mitigate oil price volatility. Impartial courts matter probably because they reduce contract uncertainties in financial 
and property rights transactions and therefore are indirectly relevant, which is why we do not claim that the results 
are solely driven by financial depth but depending on the institutional measure under consideration, could go either 
way. 
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4. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Recent studies of the resource curse have discovered that the curse is driven, not so much by abundance 
itself, but by the volatility of the resource revenue. As a result, it has been suggested that better 
institutions may mitigate the negative growth effects of resource volatility. In this paper, which focuses 
on oil price volatility, we use this opportunity to develop a quasi-natural experiment in order to study the 
impact of financial depth by offering a more precise channel through which this mitigation of volatility is 
achieved. We investigate this proposition using first a synthetic control (counterfactual) method to 
capture the degree to which financial depth mitigates the negative effects of oil volatility and then panel 
CS-ARDL regressions (thereby, as opposed to much of the literature, taking into account all three key 
features of the panel: dynamics, heterogeneity and cross-sectional dependence). 
  The counterfactual exercise provides support to the idea that financial depth does indeed 
mitigate the negative effects oil price volatility. This is evidenced by the fact that the counterfactuals 
which posit an alternative scenario, where treated countries have higher financial depth measures, show 
a significant decrease in output volatility and higher growth rates in 2015, corroborating the idea that 
financial depth contributes positively to growth directly and indirectly through output and growth 
volatility mitigation.  We also find evidence which suggests that better financial depth is required as the 
degree of dependence on oil increases. 
Next, we verify and generalize our findings using the CS-ARDL approach for about 30 oil producing 
countries over three decades (1980-2016), that it is in fact oil price volatility that contributes to the oil 
curse, and that good financial institutions can help mitigate the negative effects of oil price volatility. We 
find that this is especially true during periods of unexpected negative oil price shocks. In all cases, we also 
find direct positive contribution of financial depth to growth. We are also able to separate the effect of 
financial institutions from institutions in general, addressing the endogeneity and causality problems that 
exists in such studies, and we show that it is indeed financial depth that drives the oil price volatility 
mitigation, providing some much-needed clarity in the literature. Finally, we find that in the presence of 
more openness via trade and finance, financial institutions are still able to mitigate oil price fluctuations 
and that better institutions overall (especially legal) improve the ability of a country to better mitigate oil 
price fluctuations. 
 The policy implications of this paper are quite clear, the adverse consequences of the volatility 
of natural resource income in general and oil in particular, can be mitigated with better financial 
institutions. For resource-rich countries (especially Middle East and North African countries) better 
financial institutions will go a long way in reducing the volatility curse when it comes to commodity price 
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fluctuations. This also serves as a lesson for Asian countries who are ramping up commodity production 
in general, as well as the Asian countries in our sub-sample such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, 
Philippines, and Thailand; growth in oil production has to be accompanied with deeper financial 
institutions that are less centrally controlled. The flexibility of a freer financial system here allows for 
quicker market adaptation to oil and commodity price fluctuations so as to better allocate capital, leading 
to steady growth. In addition, countries must be sure to diversify their focus so as not to remain beholden 
to the whims of a volatile commodities market. As the experiment in Nigeria shows, growing other sectors 
as oil (and commodity) production increases, decreases the degree of dependence which leads to steadier 
growth and much less economy wide volatility.  Finally, better developed institutions increase the ability 
of countries to better mitigate the negative effects of commodity price fluctuations. Armed with this 
knowledge, developing countries looking to natural resources to grow their economy can succeed where 
others have failed. 
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Table 1: Optimal weights of potential control countries 
 
Brunei Kuwait Oman Qatar Kazakhstan Malaysia Mexico Norway Trinidad 
Algeria 0 0 0 0.266 0.628 0.009 0 0.097 0 
Angola 0 0 0 0.039 0.267 0 0 0.693 0 
Azerbaijan 0 0 0 0.244 0 0 0 0.756 0 
Cameroon 0 0 0 0.833 0 0 0 0.167 0 
Congo$ 0 0 0 0.376 0 0 0 0.624 0 
Ecuador 0 0 0 0.438 0 0.124 0 0.439 0 
Gabon$ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Indonesia 0 0 0 0.304 0 0.696 0 0 0 
Iran. 0 0.401 0 0.012 0 0.587 0 0 0 
Russia$ 0 0 0 0.008 0 0.992 0 0 0 
UAE 0.457 0 0 0 0.133 0.409 0 0 0.457 
 
Notes: Each ijth cell is the weight assigned to the potential control country j in creating the synthetic control for the treated country i. Numbers 
sum up horizontally to 1. Each row is therefore the resulting optimal weight vector W* for each treated country i. $ represents countries estimated 
differently as the resulting Hessian matrix during the minimization process (nested option on stata) was asymmetric and could not be inverted. 
The non-nested option in stata was thus used to generate the counterfactual for these countries which resulted in one country matches. 
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Table 2: Predictor Variable comparison 
 
Algeria Angola Azerbaijan Cameroon Congo$ Ecuador 
 TC SC TC SC TC SC TC SC TC SC TC SC 
Capital Stock 14.11 13.77 13.30 12.76 11.49 12.46 11.65 13.11 11.03 12.61 13.06 13.10 
Imports 23.01 23.66 22.20 22.18 21.33 21.65 20.92 22.42 20.64 21.82 22.29 22.40 
Exports 23.47 24.07 23.22 22.82 22.20 22.45 20.84 23.22 21.55 22.62 22.24 23.09 
Trade to GDP 0.69 1.35 1.09 1.15 0.84 0.93 0.46 0.82 1.37 0.90 0.61 0.85 
GDP 2006: Q1 23.80 23.71 22.54 22.63 21.54 22.28 21.94 22.90 20.34 22.42 22.96 23.02 
Oil Value 0.17 0.13 0.47 0.15 0.36 0.19 0.09 0.22 0.47 0.19 0.14 0.19 
Ka_open 0.16 0.35 0.02 0.79 0.36 0.80 0.16 0.30 0.16 0.69 0.77 0.60 
Population  17.40 16.72 16.86 15.00 16.02 14.71 16.83 16.19 15.21 15.04 16.51 15.77 
SWF 2014:Q3 1.52 2.16 0.33 1.01 4.05 2.30 0.00 5.68 0.00 3.06 0.00 3.31  
Gabon$ Indonesia Iran Russia$ UAE  
 TC SC TC SC TC SC TC SC TC SC   
Capital Stock 11.16 12.20 16.16 14.86 14.97 14.42 15.69 15.52 14.44 14.09   
Imports 20.46 21.32 24.16 24.40 23.51 24.02 24.77 25.15 24.60 23.83   
Exports 21.33 22.13 24.33 24.57 23.88 24.19 25.34 25.04 24.56 24.30   
Trade to GDP 0.88 0.97 0.51 0.66 0.47 0.78 0.50 0.61 1.54 0.90   
GDP 2006: Q1 21.15 22.02 24.69 25.21 24.45 24.73 25.42 26.12 24.78 24.63   
Oil Value 0.38 0.17 0.09 0.12 0.22 0.20 0.15 0.08 0.23 0.22   
Ka_open 0.16 1.00 0.58 0.54 0.40 0.81 0.54 0.69 1.00 0.65   
Population  14.24 14.10 19.30 17.98 18.12 17.10 18.78 18.57 15.84 16.70   
SWF 2014:Q3 0.10 0.90 0.00 2.03 0.48 0.57 0.52 0.07 11.92 7.19   
 
Notes: The table shows the average estimates of the predictor variables used to determine the optimal weights required to create the 
counterfactuals for each treated country. The average of all variables for each treated country is reported as well as the average for its 
corresponding synthetic control. TC represents the data for the treated country and SC represents the data for its corresponding synthetic 
control. $ represents countries estimated differently as the resulting Hessian matrix during the minimization process (nested option on 
stata) was asymmetric and could not be inverted. The non-nested option in stata was thus used to generate the counterfactual for these 
countries which resulted in one country matches. 
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Table 3: Annualized regressions with post-treatment years 2014, 2015 and 2016 
 All treated countries Treated countries with >10% oil-to-GDP  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Output Volatility Ratio 
Oil price  1.486** 2.291** 1.486** 2.291** 1.777** 2.736** 1.777** 2.736** 
decline (0.636) (1.013) (0.664) (1.062) (0.747) (1.203) (0.780) (1.262) 
  
 Growth Volatility Ratio 
Oil price  1.503* 3.303** 1.503* 3.303** 1.767* 3.860** 1.767* 3.860** 
decline (0.796) (1.385) (0.832) (1.452) (0.953) (1.646) (0.995) (1.727) 
         
 Differences in Output 
Oil price  -0.0128 -0.134 -0.0128 -0.134 0.0138 -0.0941 0.0138 -0.0941 
decline (0.114) (0.171) (0.119) (0.180) (0.122) (0.184) (0.128) (0.193) 
         
Countries 11 11 11 11 9 9 9 9 
Observations 121 121 121 121 99 99 99 99 
 Differences in Growth 
Oil price  -0.111 -0.0350 -0.111 -0.0350 -0.0894 0.00370 -0.0894 0.00370 
decline (0.0788) (0.177) (0.0827) (0.186) (0.0862) (0.193) (0.0904) (0.203) 
         
Countries 11 11 11 11 9 9 9 9 
Observations 110 110 110 110 90 90 90 90 
Year FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Country FE NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES 
 
Notes: *,**,*** represent levels of significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Oil price decline is a 
dummy variable that represents the cutoff point when the treatment takes place: 0 if before oil price decline and 1 after 
oil price decline. Output (growth) volatility ratio is annual output (growth) volatility of the treated country divided by 
the output (growth) volatility of the corresponding synthetic control. For these two measures, a positive estimate 
suggests that post oil price decline, the treated countries show more volatility than their counterfactual with better 
financial depth measures (from 0 to 1, ratio increases). Differences in output (growth) is the output (growth) of the 
treated country minus the output (growth) of the synthetic control. For these measures, a negative estimate suggests 
that as we move from pre to post oil price decline, output (growth) is lower in the treated country than in their synthetic 
control suggesting better performance for countries with better financial depth measures (from 0 to 1, the difference 
gets smaller).  
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Table 4: Annualized regressions with post-treatment years 2014 and 2015 
 All treated countries Treated countries with >10% oil-to-GDP  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Differences in Output 
Oil price  -0.0151 -0.139*** -0.0151 -0.139*** -0.00452 -0.131** -0.00452 -0.131** 
decline (0.0613) (0.0485) (0.0643) (0.0512) (0.0707) (0.0573) (0.0742) (0.0604) 
         
Countries 11 11 11 11 9 9 9 9 
Observations 110 110 110 110 90 90 90 90 
  
Differences in Growth 
Oil price  -0.183*** -0.179*** -0.183*** -0.179*** -0.173*** -0.164** -0.173*** -0.164** 
decline (0.0508) (0.0651) (0.0537) (0.0691) (0.0616) (0.0719) (0.0649) (0.0762) 
         
Countries 11 11 11 11 9 9 9 9 
Observations 99 99 99 99 81 81 81 81 
Year FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Country FE NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES 
Notes: See Table 3. 
 
Table 5: Annualized regressions with post-treatment years being 2014, 2015 and 2016 (placebo) 
 All control countries Control countries with better fits 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Output Volatility Ratio 
Oil price  0.417* 0.245 0.417 0.245 0.530* 0.415 0.530* 0.415 
decline (0.247) (0.513) (0.258) (0.538) (0.300) (0.655) (0.313) (0.687) 
         
 Growth Volatility Ratio 
Oil price  0.430 1.185 0.430 1.185 -0.0251 0.340 -0.0251 0.340 
decline (0.660) (1.071) (0.689) (1.124) (0.705) (0.979) (0.735) (1.027) 
         
 Differences in Output 
Oil price  0.0321 0.0685 0.0321 0.0685 0.0333 0.165 0.0333 0.165 
decline (0.108) (0.146) (0.113) (0.154) (0.118) (0.173) (0.123) (0.181) 
         
Countries 9 9 9 9 7 7 7 7 
Observations 99 99 99 99 77 77 77 77 
 Differences in Growth 
Oil price  0.0339 0.0807 0.0339 0.0807 0.0866 0.209 0.0866 0.209 
decline (0.0682) (0.244) (0.0716) (0.257) (0.076) (0.302) (0.0791) (0.318) 
         
Countries 9 9 9 9 7 7 7 7 
Observations 90 90 90 90 70 70 70 70 
Year FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Country FE NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES 
Notes: See Table 3 but note that columns 5 to 8 in this table excludes control countries with poor fits. 
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Table 6: Annualized regressions with post-treatment years being 2014 and 2015 (placebo) 
 All control countries Control countries with better fits 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Differences in Output 
Oil price  -0.00448 -0.0046 -0.00448 -0.0046 -0.0554 -0.0119 -0.0554 -0.0119 
decline (0.162) (0.142) (0.170) (0.150) (0.193) (0.189) (0.203) (0.200) 
         
Countries 9 9 9 9 7 7 7 7 
Observations 90 90 90 90 70 70 70 70 
 Differences in Growth 
Oil price  -0.00493 0.00298 -0.00493 0.00298 -0.00799 0.0200 -0.00799 0.0200 
decline (0.136) (0.157) (0.144) (0.166) (0.178) (0.207) (0.187) (0.219) 
         
Countries 9 9 9 9 7 7 7 7 
Observations 81 81 81 81 63 63 63 63 
Year FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Country FE NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES 
 
Notes: See Table 3 but note that columns 5 to 8 in this table excludes control countries with poor fits. 
 
Table 7: Results from the Special case of Nigeria 
 Pre 2014: Q3 Post 2014: Q3 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
TC SC TC/SC TC SC TC/SC 
Output volatility 0.55 0.18 3.06*** 0.11 0.11 1.00 
Growth Volatility 0.19 0.14 1.38** 0.08 0.14 0.57* 
 TC SC TC-SC TC SC TC-SC 
Average Output level  24.85 24.86 -0.01 25.57 25.1 0.47*** 
Average Growth level 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 -0.01 
 
Notes: *,**,*** represent levels of significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively TC 
is treated country and SC is the corresponding synthetic control 
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Table 8: CS-ARDL using PMG: Baseline, Domestic Financial measures and Isolating unexpected negative shocks  
 Growth Rates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Oil price 2.398*** 1.314* 3.469*** 1.283* -1.424* -1.469 1.358** -0.648 -0.537 
Growth (0.575) (0.728) (0.971) (0.672) (0.765) (0.943) (0.654) (0.793) (1.010) 
          
Oil price -2.161** -3.71*** -4.86***       
Growth Volatility (0.984) (1.088) (1.445)       
          
Negative Oil Shocks    -5.009*** -8.625*** -11.04***    
    (1.708) (1.664) (2.080)    
          
Negative Oil Shocks ×       -0.309 -0.893*** -0.868*** 
Finance        (0.200) (0.230) (0.295) 
          
Finance       0.546*** 0.763*** 0.513*** 
       (0.134) (0.120) (0.114) 
          
Error correction -0.76*** -0.81*** -0.75*** -0.745*** -0.815*** -0.794*** -0.773*** -0.837*** -0.880*** 
 (0.0457) (0.0585) (0.0690) (0.0452) (0.0571) (0.0677) (0.0438) (0.0613) (0.0747) 
Countries 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Observations 990 960 930 960 930 900 990 960 930 
 
Notes: Regressions are run using the pooled mean group estimator. The ARDL is cross sectionally adjusted using average output, but this variable is not 
reported. Standard errors in parentheses with *,** and *** representing significance at the 90, 95 and 99% confidence intervals. Columns 1, 4, and 7 
represent an empirical model specification of one lag; columns 2, 5, and 8 have two lags and columns 3, 6, and 9 have three lags. Short-run estimates 
were included but not reported. Finance is the aggregate measure of financial institutions used in this analysis, which is a combination of bank ownership measures, 
private sector credit and interest rate controls. Negative oil shocks are constructed by the interaction of oil price growth volatility with a dummy variable which takes the 
value of 1, when oil price growth is negative beyond one standard deviation of the mean, and 0 otherwise, signifying unexpected negative oil price shocks. Comparing 
columns 4-6 to columns 7-9, the mitigating role of financial depth in cushioning the effect of the negative oil shock is quite evident: The coefficient of Fiance X Oil shock 
although still negative, is less than one tenth the of the negative effect of oil shock without finance. This suggests the benefit of strong financial institutions (see table 9 
for more on this effect). A versions of this table where the level of finance was introduced to columns 4-6 still showed significant reductions in coefficients of the 
interaction terms suggesting the reduction stems primarily from the interaction between finance and oil price volatility as opposed to just the level of financial depth. 
Results of this analysis are available from the authors upon request. 
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Table 9: CS-ARDL using PMG: Effect of financial measure subcomponents  
 
 Growth Rates 
    Ownership of banks Private sector credit Interest rate controls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Oil price 1.283* -1.424* -1.469 1.608*** 0.529 0.873 1.391** -0.679 -0.945 1.629** -0.585 0.0805 
Growth (0.672) (0.765) (0.943) (0.615) (0.702) (0.916) (0.661) (0.804) (0.921) (0.679) (0.796) (0.922) 
             
Negative Oil -5.009*** -8.625*** -11.04***          
Shocks (1.708) (1.664) (2.080)          
             
Negative Oil     -0.399** -0.603*** -0.925***       
Shocks × OOB    (0.186) (0.177) (0.245)       
             
OOB    0.313*** 0.318*** 0.286***       
    (0.0736) (0.0604) (0.0515)       
             
Negative Oil        -0.410* -0.879*** -1.559***    
Shocks × PSC       (0.220) (0.262) (0.331)    
             
PSC       0.264** 0.480*** 0.0757    
       (0.103) (0.0834) (0.0782)    
             
Negative Oil           -0.448** -0.689*** -0.865*** 
Shocks × IRC          (0.186) (0.187) (0.239) 
             
IRC          0.0463 -0.0520 0.222*** 
          (0.103) (0.0912) (0.0844) 
Error -0.745*** -0.815*** -0.794*** -0.784*** -0.895*** -0.877*** -0.780*** -0.857*** -0.855*** -0.765*** -0.866*** -0.900*** 
Correction (0.0452) (0.0571) (0.0677) (0.0472) (0.0658) (0.0786) (0.0439) (0.0628) (0.0813) (0.0438) (0.0587) (0.0731) 
Countries 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Observations 990 960 930 960 930 900 960 930 900 960 930 900 
 
Notes: Regressions are run using the pooled mean group estimator. The ARDL is cross sectionally adjusted using average output, but this variable is not reported. Standard 
errors in parentheses with *, ** and *** representing significance at the 90, 95 and 99% confidence intervals. Columns 1, 4, 7 and 10 represent an empirical model 
specification of one lag; columns 2, 5, 8 and 11 have two lags and columns 3, 6, 9 and 12 have three lags. Short-run estimates were included but not reported. OOB is the 
ownership of banks measure, PSC is a measure of private sector credit and IRC is a measure of interest rate control. Negative oil shocks are constructed by the interaction 
of oil price growth volatility with a dummy variable which takes the value of 1, when oil price growth is negative beyond one standard deviation of the mean, and 0 
otherwise, signifying unexpected negative oil price shocks. Comparing columns 4- 6, 7-9 and 10 to 12 to columns 1 – 3, the interaction between all sub components of 
the financial measure, and negative oil shocks is also much less negative, suggesting that better financial institutions as measured by each component, better mitigates the 
unexpected negative effects of oil price volatility.  
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Table 10: CS-ARDL using PMG: Robustness to inclusion of Trade and financial openness measures  
 Growth Rates 
    Trade Openness De-facto financial openness De-jure financial openness 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Oil price 1.283* -1.424* -1.469 1.417** -1.062 -1.076 1.019 -1.237 -0.810 1.306** 0.242 0.318 
Growth (0.672) (0.765) (0.943) (0.646) (0.754) (0.788) (0.637) (0.759) (0.817) (0.648) (0.752) (0.866) 
             
Negative Oil -5.009*** -8.625*** -11.04***          
Shocks (1.708) (1.664) (2.080)          
             
Negative Oil    -0.327 -0.845*** -0.716*** -0.370* -0.917*** -0.836*** -0.347* -0.763*** -0.692*** 
Shocks× Finance    (0.199) (0.219) (0.258) (0.193) (0.218) (0.239) (0.198) (0.205) (0.240) 
             
Finance    0.575*** 0.810*** 0.493*** 0.533*** 0.725*** 0.481*** 0.639*** 0.688*** 0.612*** 
    (0.134) (0.124) (0.109) (0.127) (0.117) (0.0929) (0.149) (0.126) (0.107) 
             
Trade    0.0142 0.631*** 1.106***       
Openness    (0.144) (0.180) (0.221)       
             
De-facto fin       -0.0186 0.00971 -0.0201    
Openness       (0.141) (0.109) (0.0934)    
             
De-jure fin          -0.396 1.307 1.462* 
Openness          (1.000) (0.898) (0.789) 
Error  -0.745*** -0.815*** -0.794*** -0.770*** -0.789*** -0.875*** -0.780*** -0.830*** -0.962*** -0.773*** -0.857*** -0.962*** 
Correction (0.0452) (0.0571) (0.0677) (0.0389) (0.0489) (0.0819) (0.0431) (0.0599) (0.0938) (0.0444) (0.0618) (0.0835) 
Countries 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Observations 990 960 930 960 930 900 960 930 900 955 925 895 
 
Notes: Regressions are run using the pooled mean group estimator. The ARDL is cross sectionally adjusted using average output, but this variable is not 
reported. Standard errors in parentheses with *,** and *** representing significance at the 90, 95 and 99% confidence intervals. Columns 1, 4, 7 and 10 
represent an empirical model specification of one lag; columns 2, 5, 8 and 11 have two lags and columns 3, 6, 9 and 12 have three lags. Short-run estimates were 
included but not reported. Negative oil shocks are constructed by the interaction of oil price growth volatility with a dummy variable which takes the value of 1, when 
oil price growth is negative beyond one standard deviation of the mean, and 0 otherwise, signifying unexpected negative oil price shocks.  All columns show that financial 
depth mitigates volatility in the presence of different measures of openness.  
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Table 11: CS-ARDL using PMG: Separating financial institutions from aggregate institutional measures  
 Growth Rates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Oil price 1.283* -1.424* -1.469 1.358** -0.648 -0.537 1.270** -0.141 -1.670** 
Growth (0.672) (0.765) (0.943) (0.654) (0.793) (1.010) (0.641) (0.761) (0.729) 
          
Negative Oil -5.009*** -8.625*** -11.04***       
Shocks (1.708) (1.664) (2.080)       
          
Negative Oil    -0.309 -0.893*** -0.868***    
Shocks × Finance    (0.200) (0.230) (0.295)    
          
Finance     0.546*** 0.763*** 0.513***    
    (0.134) (0.120) (0.114)    
          
Fraser       1.544*** 2.174*** 1.851*** 
       (0.319) (0.303) (0.234) 
          
Negative Oil       -0.595*** -0.778*** -0.948*** 
Shocks × Fraser       (0.230) (0.235) (0.215) 
          
Error  -0.745*** -0.815*** -0.794*** -0.773*** -0.837*** -0.880*** -0.763*** -0.822*** -0.887*** 
Correction (0.0452) (0.0571) (0.0677) (0.0438) (0.0613) (0.0747) (0.0438) (0.0622) (0.0859) 
Countries 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Observations 990 960 930 990 960 930 960 930 900 
 
Notes: Regressions are run using the pooled mean group estimator. The ARDL is cross sectionally adjusted using average output, but this variable is not 
reported. Standard errors in parentheses with *,** and *** representing significance at the 90, 95 and 99% confidence intervals. Columns 1, 4, and 10 
represent an empirical model specification of one lag; columns 2, 5, 8 and 11 have two lags and columns 3, 6, 9 and 12 have three lags. Short-run 
estimates were included but not reported. Negative oil shocks are constructed by the interaction of oil price growth volatility with a dummy variable which takes the 
value of 1, when oil price growth is negative beyond one standard deviation of the mean, and 0 otherwise, signifying unexpected negative oil price shocks.  Columns 4-6 
show that financial institutions still mitigate volatility in the presence of the overall measure 7- 9 verify the mitigating strength of the aggregate institutional measure 
(Fraser chain linked index) and 10 -12 show that a combination of financial institutions and other institutional measures better mitigate the effect of oil price growth 
volatility. See section 3.3.4 for more details. 
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Table 12: Correlation coefficients between some components of the Fraser chain link index and the 
overall index 
Sub components Correlation with overall 
index 
Financial Measures 
Ownership of Banks 0.9313 
Private Sector Credit 0.7819 
Interest Rate Controls 0.9597 
Non-Financial Measures 
Hiring and Firing regulations -0.4196 
Gov. consumption -0.5598 
Transfers and subsidies -0.3308 
Judicial independence -0.8283 
Military interference in rule of law -0.5156 
Business costs of crime 0.1154 
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Appendix 
Table 13: Data Sources 
Variables Sources 
Ownership of banks Fraser chain linked index data set 
Private sector credit Fraser chain linked index data set 
Interest rate controls negative Fraser chain linked index data set 
Population Penn World Tables 
Government Consumption Fraser chain linked index data set 
Transfers and subsidies Fraser chain linked index data set 
Judicial independence Fraser chain linked index data set 
Impartial courts Fraser chain linked index data set 
Fraser chain linked Summary Index Fraser chain linked index data set 
Total assets and Liabilities IMF International Financial Statistics Database 
Seasonally adjusted quarterly GDP (for measure 
verification) 
OECD Statistical database 
GDP World Bank World Development Indicator Database 
Capital stock at constant 2011 national prices (in 
mil. 2011US$) 
Penn World Tables 
Chinn-Ito Dejure measure of financial openness http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/Chinn-Ito_website.htm 
oil value to GDP ratio Oil and Gas data Ross(2013) 
http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/mlross 
Trade to GDP ratio World Bank World Development Indicator Database 
Import to GDP ratio World Bank World Development Indicator Database 
Oil Price United States department of energy via quandl.com and 
OPEC (opec.org) 
Exports IMF International Financial Statistics Database 
Imports IMF International Financial Statistics Database 
Sovereign wealth funds Sovereign wealth funds Institute 
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Table 14: List of control and treated countries 
Treated Countries % of oil value to GDP Control countries % of oil value to GDP 
Angola 59.40% Brunei Darussalam 33.20% 
Azerbaijan 43.70% Kuwait 48.20% 
Congo, Rep. 59.40% Oman 44.30% 
Gabon 45.60% Qatar 37.80% 
Algeria 18.50% Kazakhstan 25.30% 
Cameroon 9.80% Malaysia 8.50% 
Ecuador 15.50% Mexico 8.30% 
Indonesia 9.10% Norway 12.40% 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 24.90% Trinidad and Tobago 19.10% 
Russian Federation 16.50% 
  
United Arab Emirates 26.01% 
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Table 15: List of countries in the CS-ARDL sample 
Country Finance Measure percent oil value of GDP 
Argentina 6.90 4.37% 
Australia 9.63 1.48% 
Austria 9.03 0.16% 
Benin 8.50 1.40% 
Brazil 5.98 1.79% 
Canada 9.84 3.44% 
Chile 9.01 0.51% 
Denmark 9.77 1.26% 
Ecuador 8.00 15.46% 
Egypt 6.04 14.42% 
Ghana 6.79 0.48% 
Greece 6.84 0.12% 
Guatemala 8.93 0.74% 
Hungary 7.98 0.82% 
India 6.62 1.52% 
Indonesia 7.33 9.13% 
Iran 4.78 24.89% 
Malaysia 8.60 8.48% 
Mexico 8.37 8.29% 
Netherlands 9.48 0.14% 
New Zealand 9.44 0.57% 
Norway 9.49 12.38% 
Pakistan 7.29 0.75% 
Philippines 8.75 0.20% 
Thailand 8.70 0.78% 
Tunisia 7.47 6.32% 
Turkey 6.63 0.37% 
United Kingdom 8.84 1.64% 
United States 9.14 1.19% 
Venezuela 7.56 28.52% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
